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1 Introduction
One of the most signi…cant results in the matching literature is the one
establishing that the set of stable matchings has a lattice structure. A set
has a lattice structure if we can de…ne on it a partial ordering and two
binary operations (the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound).
The structure is important for at least two reasons. First, it indicates that
even if agents of the same side of the market compete for agents of the
other side, this con‡ict is attenuated since, on the set of stable matchings,
agents of the same side have a coincidence of interests. Second, it has proved
to be very useful: many algorithms that yield stable matchings (and are
used in real centralized markets) are based on this lattice structure, or some
related properties.1 The lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for
the marriage model was …rst established by Knuth (1976), who attributed
the result to Conway. Roth (1985) showed that the least upper bound and
the greatest lower bound used by Knuth (1976) did not work in a more
general many-to-many model. Blair (1988) proposed a natural extension
of the partial ordering used in Knuth (1976). However, this was ‡awed
because its least upper bound and greatest lower bound were unnatural and
intrincate since they were obtained as the outcomes of nontrivial sequences of
matchings. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) extended the result of the marriage
model to the college admissions problem with responsive preferences. Our
objective here is to further extend their result by proposing, for a many-to-
one model with substitutable and q¡separable preferences, two very natural
binary operations that give a lattice structure to the set of stable matchings.
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) referred to the “college admissions model
with substitutable preferences” as the class of allocation problems consist-
ing of matching agents who can be divided, from the very beginning, into
two disjoint subsets: institutions (called …rms) and individuals (called work-
ers). Firms are restricted to having substitutable preferences over subsets of
workers, while workers may have all possible (strict) orderings over the set of
…rms. Each …rm, on one side, has to be matched with a group of workers, on
the other side, although both, …rms and workers, may remain unmatched. A
1Roth (1984, 1986, 1990, and 1991), Mongell and Roth (1991), Roth and Xing (1994),
and Romero-Medina (1997) are examples of papers studying particular matching prob-
lems like entry-level professional labor markets, student admissions at colleges, american
sororities, etc. See Gus…eld and Irving (1989) for algorithms exploiting the structure of
the set of stable matchings.
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matching ¹ is called stable if all agents have acceptable partners and there
is no unmatched worker-…rm pair who both would prefer to be matched to
each other rather than staying with their current partners.
In the two more speci…c models already mentioned at the beginning of
this introduction, the marriage model and the college admissions problem
with responsive preferences,2 the set of stable matchings has a special lattice
structure. We can de…ne on it the partial ordering ºF that has ¹ ºF ¹0
if every …rm considers the set of partners in matching ¹ at least as good
as the set of partners in matching ¹0. Replacing “…rm” by “worker” in the
de…nition above we obtain another partial ordering ºW which coincides with
¹F . Moreover, given two stable matchings we can …rst let …rms choose the
best subset of workers and second, we can let them choose the worse one;
these are usually called the “pointing” functions and they are the least upper
bound and the greatest lower bound relative to the partial order ºF (we have
already referred to them as binary operations). Surprisingly, in both cases
we get another stable matching. Moreover, the stable matching obtained
when …rms choose the best set of partners is in fact the one we would have
obtained if we had let workers choose the worse of the two …rms; and vice
versa, the one obtained by letting …rms choose the worse subset is in fact the
same one obtained after workers had chosen their best partner.
In this paper we identify a weaker condition than responsiveness, called
separability with quota, or q¡separability, that together with substitutability
partly restores the natural interpretation of the lattice structure of the set
of stable many-to-one matchings. Moreover, we also show that even under
q¡separable and substitutable preferences the classical pointing functions
may not be matchings (see Examples 1 and 2). Roth (1985) already had a
counterexample showing that this may be the case for a more general many-
to-many model. We want to emphasize that our examples have a genuine
interest and they are not a consequence of Roth’s (1985) negative result since
our model is much more speci…c.
The paper has also a positive side. We show that, under q¡separable
and substitutable preferences of …rms, and given two stable matchings, if we
only ask to each worker to choose the best …rm of the two, we obtain an
stable matching; similarly, if we ask them to choose the worst one (Theorem
1). Moreover, with these two “pointing” functions for the workers, the set of
2See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a precise and formal de…nition of responsive pref-
erences as well as for a masterful analysis of both models.
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stable matchings has a very natural lattice structure with the partial order
ºW (Corollary 3). Finally, combining our result (Theorem 1) and a result
in Blair (1988) we exhibit another partial order (¹W , the “opposite” unani-
mous partial order of the workers) that together with these two new pointing
functions endow the set of stable matchings with another lattice structure
(Corollary 4).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the preliminary
notation and de…nitions. Section 3 contains the de…nition of a lattice and the
statements of the results. Finally, Section 4 contains the proof of Theorem
1, the key result of the paper.
2 Preliminaries
There are two disjoint sets of agents, the set of n …rms F and the set of m
workers W. Each …rm F 2 F has a strict, transitive, and complete preference
relation P (F ) over the set of all subsets of W, and each worker has a strict,
transitive, and complete preference relation P (w) over F [ ;. Preferences
pro…les are (n+m)-tuples of preference relations and they are represented by
P = (P (F1) ; :::; P (Fn) ;P (w1) ; :::; P (wm)). Given a preference relation of a
…rm P (F ) the subsets of workers preferred to the empty set by F are called
acceptable; therefore, we are allowing that …rm F may prefer not hiring
any worker rather than hiring unacceptable subsets of workers. Similarly,
given a preference relation of a worker P (w) the …rms preferred by w to the
empty set are called acceptable; in this case we are allowing that worker w
may prefer to remain unemployed rather than working for an unacceptable
…rm. To express preference relations in a concise manner, and since only
acceptable partners will matter, we will represent preference relations as lists
of acceptable partners. For instance,
P (Fi) = fw1; w3g ; fw2g ; fw1g ; fw3g
indicates that fw1; w3gP (Fi) fw2gP (Fi) fw1gP (Fi) fw3gP (Fi) ; and
P (wj) = F1; F3
indicates that F1P (wj)F3P (wj) ;.
The assignment problem consists of matching workers with …rms main-
taining the bilateral nature of their relationship and allowing for the possi-
bility that both, …rms and workers, may remain unmatched. Formally,
3
De…nition 1 A matching ¹ is a mapping from the set F [W into the set
of all subsets of F [W such that for all w 2 W and F 2 F:
1. Either j¹ (w) j = 1 and ¹ (w) µ F or else ¹ (w) = ;:
2. ¹ (F ) 2 2W .
3. ¹ (w) = F if and only if w 2 ¹ (F ) :3
A matching ¹ is said to be one-to-one if …rms can hire at most one worker;
namely, condition 2 is replaced by: Either j¹ (F )j = 1 and ¹ (F ) µ W or else
¹ (F ) = ;. The model in which all matchings are one-to-one is also known in
the literature as themarriage model. To represent matchings concisely we will
follow the widespread notation where, for instance, given F = fF1; F2; F3g
and W = fw1; w2; w3; w4g
¹ =
µ
F1 F2 F3 ;
fw3; w4g fw1g ; fw2g
¶
represents the matching where …rm F1 is matched to workers w3 and w4, …rm
F2 is matched to worker w1, and …rm F3 and worker w2 are unmatched.
Let P be a preference pro…le. Given a set S µ W, let Ch (S; P (F ))
denote …rm F ’s most-preferred subset of S according to its preference or-
dering P (F ). A matching ¹ is blocked by a worker w if ;P (w)¹ (w); that
is, worker w prefers being unemployed rather than working for …rm ¹ (w).
Similarly, ¹ is blocked by a …rm F if ¹ (F ) 6= Ch (¹ (F ) ; P (F )). We say
that a matching is individually rational if it is not blocked by any individual
agent. A matching ¹ is blocked by a worker-…rm pair (w;F ) if w =2 ¹ (F ),
w 2 Ch (¹ (F ) [ fwg ; P (F )), and FP (w)¹ (w); that is, if they are not
matched through ¹, …rm F wants to hire w, and worker w prefers …rm F
rather than …rm ¹ (w).
De…nition 2 A matching ¹ is stable if it is not blocked by any individual
agent or any …rm-worker pair.
Given a preference pro…le P , denote the set of stable matchings by S (P ).
It is easy to construct examples of preference pro…les with the property that
3We will often abuse notation by omitting the brackets to denote a set with a unique
element. For instance here, we write ¹ (w) = F instead of ¹ (w) = fFg.
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the set of stable matchings is empty. These examples share the feature that
at least one …rm regards a subset of workers as being complements. This is
the reason why the literature has made use of the restriction that workers are
regarded as substitutes in the sense that …rms continue to want to employ a
worker even if other workers become unavailable.4
De…nition 3 A …rm F ’s preference ordering P (F ) satis…es substitutabil-
ity if for any set S containing workers w and ¹w (w 6= ¹w), if w 2 Ch (S; P (F ))
then w 2 Ch (Sn f ¹wg ; P (F )).
A preference pro…le P is substitutable if for each …rm F , the preference
ordering P (F ) satis…es substitutability.
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) proved that when …rms have substitutable
preferences, the set of stable matchings is always nonempty and coincides
with the weak core; that is, there is no loss of generality if we assume that all
blocking power is carried out by either individual agents or by …rm-worker
pairs. Moreover, the deferred-acceptance algorithms produce either the …rm-
optimal stable matching ¹F or the worker-optimal stable matching ¹W , de-
pending on whether the …rms or the workers make the o¤ers. The …rm
(worker)-optimal stable matching is unanimously considered by all …rms (re-
spectively, workers) to be the best among all stable matchings.
We will assume that …rms’ preferences satisfy a further restriction called
q¡separability.5 This is based on two ideas. First, separability, which
says that the division between good workers (wP (F ) ;) and bad workers
(;P (F )w) guides the ordering of subsets in the sense that adding a good
worker leads to a better set, while adding a bad worker leads to a worse set.6
Second, each …rm F has in addition a maximum number of positions to be
…lled: its quota qF . This limitation may arise from, for example, technologi-
cal, legal, or budgetary reasons. Since we are interested in stable matchings
we incorporate it in the preference ordering of the …rm. Therefore, even
if the number of good workers for …rm F is larger than its quota qF , all
4Kelso and Crawford (1982) were the …rst to use this property (under the name of
“gross substitutability condition”) in a cardinal matching model with salaries.
5See Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo (2000) for a detailed discussion of this
restriction.
6Sönmez (1996) and Dutta and Massó (1997) have used separable preferences in match-
ing models. It is a condition that has been extensively used in social choice; see, for
instance, Barberà, Sonneschein, and Zhou (1991).
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sets of workers with cardinality strictly larger than qF will be unacceptable.
Formally,
De…nition 4 A …rm F ’s preference ordering P (F ) over sets of workers is
qF¡separable if: (a) for all S (W such that jSj < qF and w =2 S we have
that (S [ fwg)P (F )S if and only if wP (F );, and (b) ;P (F )S for all S such
that jSj > qF .
For the purpose of studying the set of stable matchings, condition (b) in
this de…nition could be replaced by the following condition: jCh (S;P (F ))j ·
qF for all S such that jSj > qF . We choose condition (b) since it is simpler.
Sönmez (1996) used an alternative approach which consists of deleting con-
dition (b) in the de…nition but then requiring in the de…nition of a matching
that j¹ (F )j · qF for all F 2 F .
Given a set of …rms F , we will denote by q = (qF )F2F the list of quotas
and we will say that a preference pro…le P is q¡separable if each P (F ) is
qF¡separable. In principle we may have …rms with di¤erent quotas. It is
easy to construct examples which show that, in general and given a list of
quotas q, the sets of q¡separable and substitutable preferences are unrelated.
Moreover, even if all …rms have q–separable preferences the set of stable
matchings may be empty.
From now on we will assume that …rms have q-separable and substitutable
preferences. Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo (2000) establishes the fact
that, under these assumptions, agents are either “single” or matched in all
stable matchings.7 Since we will use this fact later on we state it formally as
a Remark.
Remark 1 Assume …rms have q–separable and substitutable preferences. If
an agent is single in a stable matching ¹, then he is single in any stable
matching ¹0.
3 The lattice structure of the set of stable
matchings
In our context we can de…ne a lattice on S (P ) if there exist a partial order º
and two binary operations _ and ^ on S (P ) such that for all ¹1; ¹2; º 2 S (P )
the following properties hold:
7We say that w and F are single in a matching ¹ if ¹ (w) = ; and ¹ (F ) = ;.
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(1) ¹1 _ ¹2 2 S (P ).
(2) ¹1 ^ ¹2 2 S (P ).
(3) ¹1 _ ¹2 º ¹1 and ¹1 _ ¹2 º ¹2.
(4) ¹1 º ¹1 ^ ¹2 and ¹2 º ¹1 ^ ¹2.
(5) [º º ¹1 and º º ¹2] =) [º º ¹1 _ ¹2].
(6) [¹1 º º and ¹2 º º] =) [¹1 ^ ¹2 º º].
Conditions (1) and (2) say that _ and ^ are binary operations on S (P ).
Conditions (3), (4), (5), and (6) say that ¹1_¹2 and ¹1^¹2 are, respectively,
the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound of ¹1 and ¹2 according
to the partial order º. The quadruple (S (P ) ;º;_;^) is called a lattice on
S (P ).
We will explore several possibilities of de…ning partial orderings and bi-
nary operations needed to construct a lattice on S (P ). First, we de…ne the
unanimous partial orders ºF and ºW as follows:
¹1 ºF ¹2 , ¹1R (F )¹2 for all F 2 F .
¹1 ºW ¹2 , ¹1R (w)¹2 for all w 2 W.
We are following the convention of extending preferences from the original
sets (2W andF[;) to the set of matchings. However, we now have to consider
weak orderings since the matchings ¹1 and ¹2 may associate an individual
with the same partner. These orderings are denoted by R (F ) and R (w).
For instance, to say that all …rms prefer matching ¹F to any stable matching
means that for any stable matching ¹ we have that ¹FR (F )¹ for every
F 2 F (that is, either ¹F (F ) = ¹ (F ) or else ¹F (F )P (F )¹ (F )).
Second, we consider the natural extension of the “pointing” function used
in the marriage and college admissions models. Given two matchings ¹1 and
¹2, suppose we are letting …rms select the best set of workers assigned to
them through ¹1 and ¹2. Simultaneously, we are letting workers select the
worst …rm matched with them through ¹1 and ¹2. In this way, de…ne the
pointing function ¹1 _F ¹2 on F [W by:
¹1 _F ¹2 (F ) =
½
¹1 (F ) if ¹1P (F )¹2
¹2 (F ) otherwise
for all F 2 F and
¹1 _F ¹2 (w) =
½
¹1 (w) if ¹2P (w)¹1
¹2 (w) otherwise
for all w 2 W :
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Symmetrically, given two matchings ¹1 and ¹2, suppose we are letting …rms
select the worst set of workers assigned to them through ¹1 and ¹2, and
simultaneously, we are letting workers select the best …rm matched with
them through ¹1 and ¹2. In this way, de…ne the pointing function ¹1 ^F ¹2
on F [W by:
¹1 ^F ¹2 (F ) =
½
¹2 (F ) if ¹1P (F )¹2
¹1 (F ) otherwise
for all F 2 F and
¹1 ^F ¹2 (w) =
½
¹2 (w) if ¹2P (w)¹1
¹1 (w) otherwise
for all w 2 W :
Analogously, de…ne the opposite pointing functions on F [W by:
¹1 _W ¹2 (w) =
½
¹1 (w) if ¹1P (w)¹2
¹2 (w) otherwise
for all w 2 W,
¹1 _W ¹2 (F ) =
½
¹1 (F ) if ¹2P (F )¹1
¹2 (F ) otherwise
for all F 2 F ,
¹1 ^W ¹2 (w) =
½
¹2 (w) if ¹1P (w)¹2
¹1 (w) otherwise
for all w 2 W, and
¹1 ^W ¹2 (F ) =
½
¹2 (F ) if ¹2P (F )¹1
¹1 (F ) otherwise
for all F 2 F .
The lattice theorem for the marriage model (Knuth (1976)) and the col-
lege admissions problem (Roth and Sotomayor (1990)) says that (S (P ) ;ºF ;_F ;^F)
and (S (P ) ;ºW ;_W ;^W) are lattices on S (P ). Moreover, if ¹1 and ¹2 are
stable matchings, then ¹1 ºF ¹2 , ¹2 ºW ¹1, ¹1 _F ¹2 = ¹1 ^W ¹2,
and ¹1 ^F ¹2 = ¹1 _W ¹2. To see that in our many-to-one framework,
with q¡separable and substitutable preferences, (S (P ) ;ºF ;_F ;^F) and
(S (P ) ;ºW ;_W ;^W)may not be lattices on S (P ) consider Example 1 below.
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Example 1. Let F = fF1; F2g and W = fw1; w2; w3; w4g be the two sets
of agents with the pro…le of preferences P , where
P (F1) = fw1; w2g; fw1; w3g; fw2; w4g; fw3; w4g; fw1; w4g; fw2; w3g; fw1g; fw2g;
fw3g; fw4g ,
P (F2) = fw3; w4g; fw2; w4g; fw1; w3g; fw1; w2g; fw1; w4g; fw2; w3g; fw4g; fw3g;
fw2g; fw1g ,
P (w1) = F2; F1,
P (w2) = F2; F1,
P (w3) = F1; F2, and
P (w4) = F1; F2.
It is easy to see that both, P (F1) and P (F2) are 2-separable and substi-
tutable. However, they are not responsive since fw2; w4gP (F1)fw2; w3g and
fw1; w3gP (F2)fw2; w3g but fw3gP (F1) fw4g and fw2gP (F2) fw1g. More-
over, the set of stable matchings consists of the following four matchings:
¹F =
µ
F1 F2
fw1; w2g fw3; w4g
¶
,
¹1 =
µ
F1 F2
fw1; w3g fw2; w4g
¶
,
¹2 =
µ
F1 F2
fw2; w4g fw1; w3g
¶
, and
¹W =
µ
F1 F2
fw3; w4g fw1; w2g
¶
.
Consider the two stable matchings ¹1 and ¹2. Since ¹1 (F1) = fw1; w3gP (F1) fw2; w4g =
¹2 (F1) and ¹1 (w3) = F1P (w3)F2 = ¹2 (w3) we have that ¹1 _F ¹2 (F1) =
fw1; w3g, ¹1_F ¹2 (w3) = F2, ¹1_W ¹2 (F1) = fw2; w4g, and ¹1_W ¹2 (w3) =
F1. Therefore, the pointing functions ¹1 _F ¹2 and ¹1 _W ¹2 are not even
matchings.
Now, we could …rst rede…ne the pointing functions of the …rms in two
ways by, given matchings ¹1 and ¹2, only asking each …rm to select the best
(the worst) set of workers. Namely, given ¹1 and ¹2, de…ne the function
¹1_F¹2 on F [W by:
¹1_F¹2 (F ) =
½
¹1 (F ) if ¹1P (F )¹2
¹2 (F ) otherwise
for all F 2 F and
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¹1_F¹2 (w) = F if and only if w 2 ¹1_F¹2 (F ) for all w 2 W.
Symmetrically, de…ne the pointing function ¹1^F¹2 on F [W by associating
with each …rm the worst set of workers and with each worker the correspond-
ing …rm that selects him, if any.
However, Example 2 below shows that these pointing functions are not
binary operations because again, ¹1_F¹2 and ¹1^F¹2 may not be matchings
even if ¹1 and ¹2 are stable and …rms have substitutable and q¡separable
preferences.
Example 2. Let F = fF1; F2g and W = fw1; w2; w3; w4g be the two sets
of agents with the substitutable and (2; 2)¡separable pro…le of preferences
P , where
P (F1) = fw1; w2g; fw1; w3g; fw2; w4g; fw3; w4g; fw1; w4g ; fw2; w3g ; fw1g;
fw2g; fw3g; fw4g ,
P (F2) = fw3; w4g; fw1; w3g; fw2; w4g; fw1; w2g; fw1; w4g ; fw2; w3g ; fw4g;
fw3g; fw2g; fw1g ,
P (w1) = F2; F1,
P (w2) = F2; F1,
P (w3) = F1; F2, and
P (w4) = F1; F2.
Notice that P is not responsive. Consider the following stable matchings
¹1 =
µ
F1 F2
fw1; w3g fw2; w4g
¶
and
¹2 =
µ
F1 F2
fw2; w4g fw1; w3g
¶
.
In this case, neither ¹1_F¹2 nor ¹1^F¹2 are matchings because ¹1_F¹2 (F1) =
¹1_F¹2 (F2) = fw1; w3g and ¹1^F¹2 (F1) = ¹1^F¹2 (F2) = fw2; w4g.
Second and de…nitely, we can rede…ne the pointing functions for the work-
ers also in two ways by, given matchings ¹1 and ¹2, only asking each worker
to select the best (the worst) …rm. Namely, given ¹1 and ¹2, de…ne the
function ¹1_W¹2 on F [W by:
¹1_W¹2 (w) =
½
¹1 (w) if ¹1P (w)¹2
¹2 (w) otherwise
for all w 2 W and
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¹1_W¹2 (F ) = fw : ¹1_W¹2 (w) = Fg for all F 2 F .
Symmetrically, de…ne the pointing function ¹1^W¹2 on F [W by matching
each worker with his worst …rm and each …rm with the corresponding set of
workers that selected it, if any.
We can now state the main result of the paper.
Theorem 1 Let P be a pro…le of substitutable and q¡separable preferences
and assume that ¹1 and ¹2 are stable. Then, ¹1^W¹2 and ¹1_W¹2 are both
stable matchings.
The proof that ¹1^W¹2 is stable will consist of two steps. We will …rst
note, by applying Theorem 7 in Roth (1985), that the matching obtained by
giving to each …rm the “choice set of the union of ¹1 and ¹2” is stable. Second,
Proposition 2 below will establish that this matching is indeed ¹1^W¹2.
De…nition 5 Given matchings ¹1 and ¹2 the choice set of the union of
¹1 and ¹2 is the function ¸ on F [W de…ned by:
¸(F ) = Ch(¹1(F ) [ ¹2(F ); P (F )), for F 2 F and
¸ (w) = F if and only if w 2 ¸ (F ) , for w 2 W :
Proposition 2 Let P be a pro…le of substitutable and q¡separable prefer-
ences and assume that ¹1 and ¹2 are two stable matchings. Then, the choice
set of the union of ¹1 and ¹2 is equal to ¹1^W¹2; that is, ¸ = ¹1^W¹2.
The following example, taken from Roth (1985), shows that Theorem 1,
as well as Proposition 2, are false without the q¡separability condition.
Example 3. (Roth (1985) Let F = fF1; F2; F3; F4; F5g be the set of …rms
and W = fw1; w2; w3; w4; w5; w6g be the set of workers. As in Roth (1985),
it will not be necessary to specify the full preference ordering of each agent,
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since they may be extended in several ways and still preserve the substi-
tutability of the …rms’ preferences. The preference pro…le is as follows:
P (F1) = fw4g ; fw1g ; fw2; w3; w5; w6g ; :::; fw5g ; :::
P (F2) = fw2g ; fw1; w3g ; :::
P (F3) = fw3g ; fw2g ; :::
P (F4) = fw5g ; fw4; w6g ; :::
P (F5) = fw6g ; fw5g ; :::
P (w1) = F2; F1; :::
P (w2) = F1; F3; F2; :::
P (w3) = F1; F2; F3; :::
P (w4) = F4; F1; :::
P (w5) = F1; F5; F4; :::
P (w6) = F1; F4; F5; :::
Notice that P (F1), P (F2), and P (F4) are not q¡separable. Consider the
following two stable matchings
¹1 =
µ
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
fw1g fw2g fw3g fw4; w6g fw5g
¶
and
¹2 =
µ
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
fw4g fw1; w3g fw2g fw5g fw6g
¶
.
First, it is easy to check that ¹1^W¹2 (F1) = fw1; w4g since ¹1^W¹2 (w1) =
F1 and ¹1^W¹2 (w4) = F1. However, ¸ (F1) = fw4g sinceCh (¹1 (F1) [ ¹2 (F1) ; P (F1)) =
Ch (fw1; w4g ; P (F1)) = fw4g. Therefore, the conclusion of Proposition 2
does not hold because ¸ 6= ¹1^W¹2. Moreover, sincew1 =2 Ch (¹1^W¹2 (F1) ; P (F1))
we have that ¹1^W¹2 is not individually rational for F1 and thus, it is not
stable. Finally, notice that the matching
¹1_W¹2 =
µ
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
; fw1; w3g fw2g fw4; w6g fw5g
¶
is not stable since the pair (F1; w5) blocks it. Therefore, if …rms’ preferences
are not q¡separable, ¹1^W¹2 and ¹1_W¹2 may not be stable matchings.
Once we have established the stability of ¹1^W¹2 and ¹1_W¹2 it is im-
mediate to see that properties (1) to (6) of the de…nition of a lattice on S (P )
are satis…ed using the unanimous partial order ºW . Therefore, we can state
the …rst consequence of Theorem 1 in the form of the following corollary.
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Corollary 3 Let P be a pro…le of substitutable and q¡separable preferences.
Then, (S (P ) ;ºW ;^;_) is a lattice on S (P ), where ^ = ^W and _ = _W .
Following Blair (1988), de…ne the partial ordering ºBF on S (P ) as follows:
given matchings ¹1 and ¹2,
¹1 ºBF ¹2 , Ch (¹1 (F ) [ ¹2 (F ) ; P (F )) = ¹1 (F ) for all F 2 F .
Theorem 4.5 of Blair (1988) says that if …rms have substitutable preferences,
then ¹1 ºBF ¹2 , ¹2 ºW ¹1 for all stable matchings ¹1 and ¹2. Therefore,
as a conclusion of Theorem 1 we can also state the following corollary, which
can be seen as the “con‡ict” counterpart of the previous natural lattice struc-
ture (S (P ) ;ºW ;^W ;_W) since it uses for the …rms the opposite unanimous
ordering of the workers as the partial order on S (P ).
Corollary 4 Let P be a pro…le of substitutable and q¡separable preferences.
Then,
¡
S (P ) ;ºBF ;^;_
¢
is a lattice on S (P ), where ^ = _W and _ = ^W .
4 The proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 5 (Theorem 7 in Roth (1985)) Let P be any substitutable pro…le of
preferences and let ¹1 and ¹2 be two stable matchings.
8 Then, the choice set
of the union of ¹1 and ¹2 is an stable matching.
Proof of Proposition 2 Is is su¢cient to show that ¸ (F ) = ¹1^W¹2 (F )
for all F 2 F . First, we show that for all F 2 F , ¸ (F ) µ ¹1^W¹2 (F ).
Suppose the contrary; namely, there exists F 2 F and w 2 ¸ (F ) such that
w =2 ¹1^W¹2 (F ) . (1)
Since w 2 ¹1(F ) [ ¹2(F ) we may assume without loss of generality that
¹1(w) = F and ¹2 (w) 6= F . Condition (1) implies F = ¹1 (w)P (w)¹2 (w).
Then the pair (w; F ) blocks ¹2 since w 2 Ch (¹2 (F ) [ fwg ; P (F )) because
P (F ) is substitutable and w 2 ¸ (F ).
Second, we show that ¹1^W¹2 (F ) µ ¸ (F ) for all F 2 F . Assume
otherwise; that is, there exist F 2 F and
w 2 ¹1^W¹2 (F ) (2)
8Notice that we do not require here that the preference pro…le P be q¡separable.
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such that w =2 ¸ (F ). Substitutability and q¡separability of P (F ), stability
of ¸, and Remark 1 imply that [w =2 ¸ (F ) =) w =2 ¹1 (F ) \ ¹2 (F )], because
if w 2 ¹1 (F )\¹2 (F ) and w =2 ¸ (F ) then w is unmatched in ¸, which contra-
dicts Remark 1. Without loss of generality, assume that w 2 ¹2 (F ) n¹1 (F ).
Therefore, by condition (2), F 0 = ¹1 (w)P (w)¹2 (w) = F for some F
0,
which implies by the substitutability and q¡separability of P (F ), the stabil-
ity of ¸, and Remark 1 that w 2 ¸ (F 0) and w =2 ¹1^W¹2 (F 0) contradicting
¸ (F 0) µ ¹1^W¹2 (F 0).
To prove that ¹1_W¹2 is stable we need to establish a preliminary result
which is presented in the following Lemma.
Lemma 6 Let P be a pro…le of substitutable and q¡separable preferences
and assume that ¹1 and ¹2 are two stable matchings. Then, for all F 2 F :
j¹1_W¹2(F )j = j¹1(F )j = j¹2(F )j .
Proof. Assume that there exists ~F 2 F such that
¯¯¯
¹1( ~F )
¯¯¯
<
¯¯¯
¹1_W¹2( ~F )
¯¯¯
.
Then, we can …nd bw 2 ¹1_W¹2( ~F )n¹1( ~F ) such that the pair ( bw; ~F ) blocks ¹1,
since bw 2 ¹2( ~F ), ~FP ( bw)¹1( bw); and ¯¯¯¹1( ~F )¯¯¯ < ¯¯¯¹1_W¹2( ~F )¯¯¯ · q ~F . There-
fore,
j¹1_W¹2(F )j · j¹1(F )j for all F 2 F .
Assume that there exists bF 2 F with the property that¯¯¯
¹1_W¹2( bF )¯¯¯ < ¯¯¯¹1( bF )¯¯¯ .
Then, X
F2F
j¹1_W¹2(F )j <
X
F2F
j¹1(F )j
which implies that there exists bw 2 [F2F¹1(F )n [F2F ¹1_W¹2(F ). By the
q¡separability and substitutability of P and Remark 1, we have that there
exist two …rms, bF and ~F , such that bw 2 ¹1( bF ) and bw 2 ¹2( ~F ). Then, by the
de…nition of _W ; we have either bw 2 ¹1_W¹2( bF ) or bw 2 ¹1_W¹2( ~F ) which
contradicts the fact that bw =2 [F2F¹1_W¹2(F ):
Now, we are ready to establish the stability of ¹1_W¹2.
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Lemma 7 Let P be a pro…le of substitutable and q¡separable preferences
and assume that ¹1 and ¹2 are two stable matchings. Then, ¹1_W¹2 is a
stable matching:
Proof. The individual rationality of matching _W for each worker is a direct
consequence of its de…nition. We will …rst show that _W is individually
rational for each …rm F 2 F ; namely, ¹1_W¹2(F ) = Ch(¹1_W¹2(F ); P (F ))
for all F 2 F : Since Ch (S; P (F )) denotes …rm F ’s most-preferred subset
of S, we have that Ch(¹1_W¹2(F ); P (F )) µ ¹1_W¹2(F ) for all F 2 F .
Assume there exists ¹F 2 F such that Ch(¹1_W¹2( ¹F ); P ( ¹F )) ( ¹1_W¹2( ¹F ).
Then, we have that
¯¯
Ch(¹1_W¹2( ¹F ); P ( ¹F ))
¯¯
<
¯¯
¹1_W¹2( ¹F )
¯¯ · q ¹F (the last
inequality is implied by Lemma 6). Let
~w 2 £¹1_W¹2( ¹F )¤ n £Ch(¹1_W¹2( ¹F ); P ( ¹F ))¤ .
Because ~w 2 ¹1( ¹F ) or ~w 2 ¹2( ¹F ), we have that ~wP ( ¹F ); and by the
q¡separability of P ( ¹F ) that£
Ch(¹1_W¹2( ¹F ); P ( ¹F )) [ f ~wg
¤
P ( ¹F )Ch(¹1_W¹2( ¹F ); P ( ¹F )) (3)
holds. But since ~w 2 ¹1_W¹2( ¹F ) condition (3) means that Ch(¹1_W¹2( ¹F ); P ( ¹F ))
is not …rm ¹F ’s most-preferred subset of ¹1_W¹2( ¹F ), which is a contradiction.
To …nish with the proof that ¹1_W¹2 is a stable matching, assume that
the pair ( ~w; ~F ) blocks ¹1_W¹2; namely,
~w =2 ¹1_W¹2
³
~F
´
,
~w 2 Ch(¹1_W¹2( ~F ) [ f ~wg ; P ( ~F )), and
~FP ( ~w)¹1_W¹2( ~w). (4)
We distinguish between the following two cases:
Case 1:
¯¯¯
¹1_W¹2( ~F )
¯¯¯
< q ~F : Then, the pair ( ~w; ~F ) also blocks both ¹1
and ¹2, because by condition (4) we have that
~FP ( ~w)¹1_W¹2( ~w)R( ~w)¹k( ~w)
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for k = 1; 2, which also implies that ~w =2 ¹k
³
~F
´
. Since
¯¯¯
¹k( ~F )
¯¯¯
< q ~F (by
Lemma 6), ~wP ( ~F ); and q¡separability of P
³
~F
´
we have that
~w 2 Ch
³
¹k
³
~F
´
[ ~w; P
³
~F
´´
.
Case 2:
¯¯¯
¹1_W¹2( ~F )
¯¯¯
= q ~F : Then, there exists w1 2 ¹1_W¹2( ~F ) such
that
w1 =2 Ch(¹1_W¹2( ~F ) [ f ~wg ; P ( ~F )). (5)
Without loss of generality, we assume that w1 2 ¹2( ~F ): We claim that the
following equality
Ch(
h
¹1_W¹2( ~F ) [ f ~wg
i
[ ¹2( ~F ); P ( ~F )) = ¹2( ~F ) (6)
holds. Assume that there existsw 2
h
Ch(
h
¹1_W¹2( ~F ) [ f ~wg
i
[ ¹2( ~F ); P ( ~F ))
i
n
h
¹2( ~F )
i
.
Then either w = ~w, in which case, by condition (4) and the substitutability
of P
³
~F
´
, the pair
³
~w; ~F
´
also blocks ¹2, or else (w 6= ~w), implying that,
w 2
h
Ch(
h
¹1_W¹2( ~F )
i
[ ¹2( ~F ); P ( ~F ))
i
n
h
¹2( ~F )
i
, by the substitutability
of P
³
~F
´
. Therefore, and again by the substitutability of P
³
~F
´
, we have
that w 2 Ch(¹2( ~F ) [ fwg ; P ( ~F )). But since w 2 ¹1_W¹2( ~F )n¹2
³
~F
´
we
have that ~FP (w)¹2(w) which implies that the pair
³
w; ~F
´
blocks ¹2. There-
fore, condition (6) holds. Finally, and applying again the assumption that
P
³
~F
´
is substitutable, we have that
w1 2 Ch(
h
¹1_W¹2( ~F ) [ f ~wg
i
[ w1; P ( ~F )),
which contradicts (5) since w1 2 ¹1_W¹2( ~F ):
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